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Abstract-we propose a practical anonymous payment scheme with anonymous accounts. By 
means of our proposed scheme, the size of a bank’s database is dramatically reduced. Also, the issue of 
e-coins for an anonymous account is controlled by several issuers, who represent a bank and who can 
be chosen by the customer or assigned by the system, on the current available issuers list according 
to the internet conditions. Our scheme does not require the assistance of a mutually entrusted third 
party. @ 2003 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. 
Keywords-payment scheme, Anonymous accounts, Privacy and security, Threshold signatures, 
Electronic commerce. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Due to the fast progress of the internet, many services such as electronic payments, electronic 
auctions, electronic voting, and electronic shopping, etc. can be achieved over it. However, these 
internet services are still inhibited because of concerns about network security. The critical success 
factors for an enterprise to provide attractive services on the internet are money flow, material 
flow, and information flow. Entrepreneurs have to provide various services on the internet in order 
to keep customers and attract new ones for electronic commerce. From a customer’s point of view, 
anonymity, security, efficiency, and flexibility are the basic criteria of electronic payment systems. 
Also, from the point of view of a bank or the government [l], security, selective anonymity, e.g., 
anonymity just for small payments, and implementation costs are most important. It is believed 
that a payment system that satisfies security, anonymity, efficiency, and micropayment may work 
well in the near future [l]. 
So far, secure payment schemes have been proposed by many researchers from practical and 
theoretical points of view [2-121. A secure payment scheme is a protocol that consists of a 
customer, a shop, and a bank. Both the shop and the customer own their accounts with the 
bank. There are two types of payment scheme for verifying the validity of an electronic payment 
transaction: on-line schemes and off-line schemes. In an on-line scheme [3,4,8,10,12], all players, 
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a customer, a shop, and a bank, have to be connected on-line when the customer buys some 
goods. In off-line schemes [2,5-7,9,11], each transaction during the protocol requires two players 
only. Off-line schemes do not prevent double-spending, but instead allow the detection of fraud 
and identification of cheaters. Off-line schemes may not be adapted by a bank because of the risk 
of double-spending [l]. In [3], efficient on-line payment schemes with anonymous accounts were 
proposed. These schemes can reduce the bank’s database. Most proposed payment schemes [2- 
12] are single authority schemes. The basic assumption of these schemes is that the single money 
issuer is trustworthy. However, the money issuer may issue extra ecoins as he wishes. If the 
money issuer does that, it may cause great danger or harm to the corporation or society. In [13], 
a multiauthority e-cash scheme is proposed. In this scheme, the issue of e-coins is controlled by 
several money issuers. 
To solve all the above problems, we propose a practical multiauthority payment scheme with 
anonymous accounts that satisfies security, anonymity, efficiency, and micropayment properties. 
In our proposed scheme, by the concept of anonymous accounts, the bank’s database is dramat- 
ically reduced. Also, our scheme does not require a single entrusted authority to issue e-coins. 
The candidates of issuers can be elected from honorable persons or audit managers. The bank 
can be regarded as a manager and cannot issue any e-coins without the help of these reliable 
money issuers. The proposed scheme would not only satisfy real world environments without 
a single trusted authority or with some absent/dishonest authorities, but could also increase 
the availability of the issuers, and increase protection against forgery by making it harder for 
perpetrators of fraud to learn the group secret key. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes some of the existing 
building blocks in the literature that we use in our scheme. In Section 3, we present our payment 
scheme. Section 4 is devoted to discussion. Finally, a concluding remark is given in Section 5. 
2. BUILDING BLOCKS 
Here we review some existing building blocks that we use in our payment scheme. 
2.1. Threshold Cryptosystems Without an Entrusted Party 
In a threshold cryptosystem, n group members share a group secret key of an organization so 
that t members (1 < t 5 n) can collaborate on deciphering a given ciphertext or on making a 
group signature. A main building block of threshold cryptosystems is distributed key generation. 
A distributed key generation scheme for threshold cryptosystems without an entrusted party was 
proposed by Pedersen [14]. The main idea in Pedersen’s distributed key generation protocol [14] 
is to execute n parallel Feldman’s verifiable secret sharing protocol [15] in which each player Pi 
performs a dealer to distribute a randomly chosen secret zi. The group secret key z is the sum 
of all honest players’ .z~‘s. Since Feldman’s verifiable secret sharing has the property of revealing 
the personal public key yi = g*” , the group public key is the product of all honest players’ public 
key yi’s. In Gennaro et al.% [16], Gennaro et al. show that Pedersen’s distributed key generation 
protocols [14] cannot ensure that the distribution of the distributed generated group public key 
is equal to uniform distribution. Part of the group public key can be under the control of an 
adversary. In [16], Gennaro et al. presented an improved distributed key generation scheme. 
The main idea in [16] Gennaro et al’s distributed key generation scheme is to execute n parallel 
Feldman’s information-theoretic verifiable secret sharing protocol [17] in which each player Pi 
performs a dealer to distribute a randomly chosen secret .~i. Before each player Pi publishes 
the public verifiable parameters Ai,k = g fi.j, 0 5 Ic 5 t - 1 and t is the scheme’s threshold, 
he commits himself to a t-degree random polynomial fi(~) = ~~~“,-’ fi,j.z + z, whose constant 
coefficient is fi,c = zi by publishing the commitments Ci,k = C(f+, fi,k), where 0 5 /c 5 t - 1, 
& is a random value chosen by Pi and C() is the commitment scheme proposed in [17]. By 
this method, an adversary cannot force a commitment by a corrupted participant Pj to depend 
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on the commitments of any set of honest players. For any player Pi who is not disqualified 
during the commitment stage, there is a unique polynomial fi(z) committed to by Pi and this 
polynomial fi( z is recoverable by t honest players. By using the information-theoretic verifiable ) 
secret sharing protocol [17], Gennaro et aZ.‘s scheme [16] can ensure that no bias for any part of 
the output group public key is possible. 
2.2. Blind Threshold Signatures 
Blind signature allows the realization of some applications in privacy protection, e.g., secure 
electronic payment systems [4] preserving customers’ anonymity and secure voting systems [18 
211 protecting voters’ privacy. For distributing the power of a single authority, Juang and Lei 
presented blind threshold signature schemes [22,23] using the blind signature schemes proposed 
in [24] and the concept of Pedersen’s distributed key generation protocol [14]. The main idea 
in Juang and Lei’s blind threshold signature schemes [22,23] is to compute a group signature by 
combining t partial signatures signed by t honest signers. Before any t honest signers can be 
cooperate to sign a group signature, all n signers must run a secure distributed key generation 
protocol [14,16] for obtaining their personal secret shadows. In the signature generation phase, 
a requester requests a blind threshold signature from the signers and the signers collaborate to 
issue the blind threshold signature to the requester. Finally, the requester can merge all partial 
signatures signed by the signers and derive the corresponding threshold signature. Anyone can 
use the group public key to verify if a threshold signature is valid. One of the underlying blind 
signature schemes of the blind threshold signature schemes [22,23] is that of Nyberg-Rueppel [24]. 
In this section, we will briefly review this scheme. 
Let m be the message to be signed, and p and q be two large strong prime numbers so that q 
divides (p - 1). Let p be a generator of 2; [25]. Let g -p @‘-1)/q, z E 2, be the signer’s secret 
key and y =.p gz be the corresponding public key. The scheme is described in the following. 
1. The signer chooses a random number k f Z,, computes 1’ =p g”, and then sends i: to the 
requester. 
2. Upon receiving i, the requester performs the following. 
(a) Choose two random numbers (Y E 2, and /3 E Zi, compute T + mg?P and 7iz zq 
p-‘r. 
(b) Check if fi # 0. If yes, send riz back to the signer. Otherwise, go back to Step (a). 
3. After receiving 7jl, the signer computes s^ =q %z + k and sends B back to the requester. 
4. Upon receiving 3, the requester computes s =q $ + CX. The blind signature of m is (r, s). 
For verifying the signature (r, s), one simply computes m fp g-‘y’r and checks if m has some 
proper redundant information. If m contains no proper redundancy, a secure one-way hashing 
function 7-t [26,27] can be used. But this method cannot provide message recovery capability. 
To verify the blind signature (r, s) on m without proper redundancy, one must send (r, s) along 
with m to the verifier. 
2.3. Untraceable EMail Schemes 
Several anonymous channel protocols [28-301 have been presented for preserving senders’ 
anonymity. The mix-net method is used in [28] to achieve a sender -untraceable e-mail sys- 
tem. In the m&net method, encrypted messages are sent to a mix server who will disarrange 
all received messages and send them to the next server. Finally, the last server will send the 
encrypted messages to their destinations. The basic assumption of the mix-net method is that 
at least one mix server is honest. In the mix-net method, it is harder to decide if a sender has 
sent his message to the receiver via an anonymous channel or if the receiver has received it. In 
practical implementation considerations, if there are audit records in the system, then this prob- 
lem is solved. Otherwise, a sender can first send his message to some entrusted authority via the 
m&nets, and then the authority resends the message to the real receiver. The dc-net method, 
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based on the dining cryptographers problem, is used in [29] to realize a sender untraceable email 
system which is unconditionally or cryptographically secure, depending on whether it is based on 
one-time keys or on keys generated by pseudo-random number generators. In the de-net method, 
an entrusted mix-server is unnecessary, but all potential senders must collaborate in the mail 
system when someone is delivering a message. In [30], Juang et al. presented an untraceable 
e-mail system in wireless communication. The user anonymity in this scheme is based neither on 
any entrusted authority nor on the collaboration of all potential senders. 
3. MULTIAUTHORITY 
PAYMENT SCHEME 
WITH ANONYMOUS ACCOUNTS 
In this section, we propose an efficient multiauthority payment scheme. To reduce the bank’s 
(the account manager’s) database, we use anonymous accounts in this scheme. Before a customer 
can use an anonymous account, he must withdraw blind e-coins from a normal bank account, 
extract the real e-coins from the blind e-coins and then transfer the e-coins to an anonymous 
account. In our scheme, blind threshold signatures [22,23] are used to distribute the power of a 
single trusted money issuer. The scheme involves a customer, shops, n’ e-coin issuers and a bank. 
The scheme consists of five phases: 
a the preparation phase, 
l the anonymous account requesting phase, 
l the withdrawal phase, 
l the anonymous deposit phase, and 
l the payment phase. 
During the preparation phase, the bank first publishes all public parameters, and then all issuers 
cooperate to generate their threshold verifiable public keys and distribute shares to each other 
without a trusted third party [16]. In the anonymous account requesting phase, a customer 
requests an anonymous account from the bank via an anonymous channel [28-301. In the with- 
drawal phase, a customer uses the uniquely blind threshold signature technique [19,22,23] to get a 
blind encrypted e-coin from t issuers and derives the real e-coin from the encrypted e-coin. In the 
anonymous deposit phase, the customer can transfer e-coins withdrawn in the withdrawal phase 
to an anonymous account opened in the anonymous account requesting phase. In the payment 
phase, if a customer decides to pay a shop some money, then he sends a PayWord [12] to the 
bank. The bank can check if the PayWord is valid and does not exceed the amount of the e-coin. 
If yes, he balances the shop’s account and stores the PayWord in the anonymous account. 
3.1. Basic Assumptions 
The underlying assumptions of this scheme are as follows. 
(a) There are at least (n - t + 1) honest money issuers, where n is total number of money 
issuers issuing e-coins and t > n/2 is the threshold value of the blind threshold signature 
scheme. 
(b) Every eligible customer can communicate with at least t out of n issuers and the shop. 
(c) There exists a secure blind threshold signature scheme [22,23], a secure secret key cryp- 
tosystem [27], a secure one-way permutation function [22,31], and a secure and efficient 
one-way hashing function [32]. 
(d) There exists a secure public key signature scheme and a public key cryptosystem [33]. 
(e) There exists a secure anonymous channel [28-301. 
The concept of blind threshold signatures [22,23] and one-way permutation functions combined 
with users’ identifications [19] are used to achieve a uniquely blind threshold signature scheme in 
our proposed scheme. 
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In (28-301, several anonymous channels have been proposed. The anonymous channels proposed 
in [28,30] can be directly used in our scheme. 
: 
For simplicity, the message authentication in our protocol is achieved by a secure signature 
scheme [33] in which the signed message m is attached with its signature Certs(‘H(m)), where 3-1 
is a secure one-way hash function and S is the identification of the signer. The verification of the 
signature can be achieved by the comparison method [34]. 
3.2. Notations 
Let 5 be a public one-way permutation function [19], let ti be a public one-way hash func- 
tion [32]. Let n’ be the number of the money issuers before the preparation phase, QUAL be 
the set of the nondisqualified money issuers after the preparation phase, let n be the number 
of nondisqualified,money issuers QUAL. Let Zi, 1 < i 5 n’, denote the identification of money 
issuer i before the preparation phase. Let Ii, 1 5 i 5 n, denote the identification of nondisqual- 
ified money issuer i after the preparation phase. Let d, be the secret key chosen by a customer 
and let dx; be the secret key chosen by Zi. The customer and Zi can publish their corresponding 
public keys e, and eri . Anyone can get e, and eri by means of some authentication service (e.g., 
the X.509 directory authentication service [27]). U sin secure public key signature schemes [33], g 
Zi and the customer can generate signatures of messages using their own secret keys dr, and d,. 
Anyone can verify the signatures using the corresponding public keys eri and e,. Let p and q 
be two large strong prime numbers such that q divides (p - l), let p and C be two generators 
of 2; [25j and C be a random number generated by a generic distributed coin flipping protocol. 
Let g zp p(P-l)/9 and h q, [(P-‘)/q. Let “ ]I ” d enote the ordinal string concatenation operator, 
let x zp y denote x = y mod p. For clarification of our scheme, we assume that the message 
transmitted in the following protocol is via some secure authentication scheme; that is, that no 
one can fake any one else’s messages and no one can deny the messages he really transmitted. 
3.3. The Proposed Scheme 
Our proposed scheme is described as follows. 
PHASE 1. THE PREPARATION PHASE. The bank first publishes all public parameters n’, t, p, 
q, g, h, all identifications of e-coins issuers and the public one-way permutation E and the public 
one-way hash function 7-f. Then, all Zi, 1 < i 5 n’, must cooperate to distribute their secret 
shadows to each other. Each Zi, 1 < i 5 n’, carries out the following steps. 
1. Zi chooses a secret key Zi E 2, and two secret polynomials fi(x) = Cili aiYkxk and 
f,!(x) = c”;’ ! k c a,,kxk such that ai,c = zi, it computes &,k =P ga”,” h”i,k, 0 5 k 5 t  - 1, and 
it sends (&,k, 0 5 k < t - 1) to Zj, 1 < j 5 n’, j # i. 
2. Upon receiving (&&k, 1 5 j < n’, j # i, 0 5 k 5 t  - 1) from all other issuers, Zi sends 
Si,j E-Q fi(xj) and 6i,j ~q fl(xj), w h ere xj is a unique public number for Zj, secretly to 
every Zj, 1 5 j 5 n’, j # i. 
3. When Zi receives all bj,i and 6$,i, 1 5 j 5 n’, j # i, from other issuers, he verifies 
if the shares Sj,, and S(,i received from Zj are consistent with the certified values Gj,l, 
0 5 1 5 t  - 1, by checking whether g6jt~hs~,~ =p n~~~(~j,~)Z’l. If it fails, Zi broadcasts that 
an error has been found, publishes &j,i and I$~, the authentication information of Sj,,, b;,i, 
and Zj. Each issuer, except the dishonest issuer Zj, then marks Zj as a disqualified issuer 
and builds the set of nondisqualified issuers QUAL. 
4. Every issuer Zi, i E QUAL, broadcasts Vi,k zp ga+, 0 5 1 5 t  - 1. 
5. When Zi , i E QUAL, receives all Vi,k, 1 < j 5 n, j # i, from other issuers in QUAL, he 
verifies if g6jsi sp n~~,‘(Vj,~)2i’. If this check f ai s or an index i, Zi broadcasts that an error 1 f 
has been found, publishes a,,, and 6&, the authentication information of bj,i, S(i,i. 1, and 
any t  issuers in QUAL can compute zj , fj (x), vj,k, 0 < k 5 t  - 1. Anyone then can generate 
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the public shadows Pj,i =p g6j,’ =p n~~~(Uj,l)x”, w h ere i and j E QUAL, and the group 
public key Y up IljcQuAL ~j zp JJjEQUAL vj,o. The group public key y and all public 
shadows Pj,i, where i and j E QUAL, the personal public key yi zr, Vi,0 zp gzi can be 
published by each issuer Xi. Without loss of generality, we assume that n nondisqualified 
issuers QUAL are 1i, 1 5 i I: n. This can be made by renaming the index of each 
issuer Zi, i E QUAL. 
PHASE 2. THE ANONYMOUS ACCOUNT REQUESTING PHASE. Let ID, be the identification of 
some customer. To request an anonymous account, ID, does the following. 
1. ID, first randomly chooses an RSA secret key drn, and the corresponding public key en&, 
and sends Eeb(e& to the bank via an anonymous channel. 
2. The bank decrypts message Eeb(eIoc), opens a new anonymous account with an account 
number ACC,, sets the counter CNT, = 0, generates a secret key K, for this account, and 
sends Eelo, (ACC, 11 K,) back to ID, via an anonymous channel or a broadcast channel. 
3. When ID, receives ,?&,(ACC, 11 K,) f rom the bank via the anonymous channel or 
broadcast channel, he decrypts the message and gets anonymous account ACC, and secret 
key K,. 
PHASE 3. THE WITHDRAWAL PHASE. Let ID, be the identification of some customer. In this 
phase, ID, applies the uniquely blind threshold signature scheme to get a blind e-coin from t 
honest issuers. Without loss of generality, we assume that t out of n issuers requested by ID, are 
Ij, 1 5 j < t. ID, and Ij, 1 < j 5 t, then perform the following steps. 
1. Each Ij randomly chooses a number kj E Z,, computes +j -p gkj and sends ?j to ID,. 
2. Upon receiving all ?j, ID, does the following. 
(a) Compute the value m = &D 11 RD II ACC, II 7-1,(g), where ‘HO(~) = 0, ‘&(cr) = 
‘F1(7&-i(g)), 1 2 i 5 2, RD is the redundant information for verification, 0 is a 
random number, HID = [(ID= II X) is a unique header, and X is a random number 
used to avoid attack by an exhaustive search. 
(b) Choose two random numbers o E 2, and ,B E ZG, and compute rj sp gap:, r -p 
m nL=, rk, and 7iz. =4 p-l?-. 
(c) Check if T% # 0. If yes, send string ti to all Ij, 1 5 j 5 t. Otherwise, go back to 
Step (b). 
3. After receiving the message 7jz, Ij, 1 < j 5 t, checks if ID, has enough money in the 
bank. If not, Ij rejects the money withdrawal of ID,. If yes, he informs the bank to 
deduct 5 dollars from ID,% account and computes dj + 7jZ(Zj + cI”=,+l(fi(zj)(n:=l,kzj 
(-xk/(zj - zk))))) + kj and sends ij back to ID,. 
4. Upon receiving all ij, 1 5 j 5 t, ID, computes sj --Q Ojpi + LYE, and checks if g-‘j7Jjrrj -p 
(IE”=,+~(%)) (Ilk-1 L#j(--Ikl(2j-lk)))(-~), 1 5 j 5 t. If Sj is not valid, he has to ask the - ’ 
corresponding issuer to send it again. Otherwise, ID, computes s zp & sj. 
5. After exact t issuers inform the bank to deduct J: dollars from ID,‘s account, the bank 
submits the deduction operation. 
PHASE 4. THE ANONYMOUS DEPOSIT PHASE. 
1. A customer sends an e-coin (T, s) withdrawn in the withdrawal phase to the bank via an 
anonymous channel. 
2. The bank computes A =p g-‘y’r =p m = HID )I RD II ACC, )I ‘H,(a) and checks whether 
or not RD contains some redundant information. If yes, the bank pays z dollars into 
ACC, and records the e-coin (r,s,m,O,‘H,(a)) in this anonymous account. The bank 
increments CNT, by zr dollars. 
PHASE 5. THE PAYMENT PHASE. Let the situation be a customer has spent r dollars in some 
shops for an e-coin (r, s, m, 7, ‘H,-,(a)) in the anonymous account ACC,, where T 5 z. Let ID, 
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be the identification of a shop. If the customer decides to pay ID, e dollars, then he, ID, and the 
bank do the following. 
1. The customer sends (ACC,, K,(ID,, ACC,, f&D, E, T-&-(,+,)(a))) to ID,. 
2. ID, then forwards (ACC,, K,(ID,, ACC,, HID, E, 3-1,-C,+,)(O))) to the bank. 
3. The bank decrypts K,(ID,, ACC,, HID, e, ?&,+,)(a)), finds the e-coin (T, s, m, T, 1-I,-, 
(u)) in the anonymous account ACC,, and checks if T + c _< 2 and 3-I,(a) = Ff~t(,+,) 
wz-(T+&)>. If Y es, the bank debits ACC, with e dollars, pays c dollars into ID,‘s 
account, and updates the e-coin (r, s, m, T + e, F&-(,+,)(o)) in the anonymous account 
ACC,. 
4. DISCUSSION 
4.1. Correctness 
In our scheme, customers will first request anonymous accounts, withdraw blind e-coins, and 
deposit these e-coins into anonymous accounts. When customers withdraw blind e-coins, to 
prevent an issuer from sending an invalid partial signature to a customer, a partial signature can 
be checked in Step 4 of the withdrawal phase. The following lemma ensures the correctness of 
partial signatures. 
LEMMA 1. The customer’s partial signature (ri, si) is valid if Ii is honest. 
PROOF. By means of our scheme, we have 
After the withdrawal phase, the threshold e-coin will be verified using the group public key in 
Step 2 of the anonymous deposit phase. Lemma 2 ensures the correctness of the threshold e-coin. 
LEMMA 2. The signature (r, s) generated in the withdrawal phase is a legal blind threshold 
signature on message m for the Nyberg-Rueppel signature scheme. 
PROOF. The validity of the signature (r, s) can easily be established as follows: 
g+ y’r 
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For achieving the divisibility property in our scheme, we use the concept of PayWord chains 
proposed in [12] in our proposed scheme. In the payment phase, for paying ID, 6 dollars, a 
customer sends (ACC,, K,(ID,, ACC,, H ID, E, X,-(,+,)(c))) to the bank. The bank first retrieves 
the corresponding e-coin (T, s, m, T, ‘H,-,(u)), where 7 5 z dollars have been spent in some shops 
for this e-coin, and verifies whether 7&(‘&-,(a)) = ‘Hz-(,+,)(~). 
The concept of the uniquely blind threshold signature technique [19,22] is used in our scheme 
to make our ecoins collision free; that is, all e-coins requested by honest customers are unique. 
The definition of a uniquely blind threshold signature scheme is as follows. 
DEFINITION 1. A uniquely blind threshold signature scheme is a blind threshold signature scheme 
in which the signing function is injective (one-to-one) and all the signatures requested by the 
honest requesters are distinct. 
It is clear that the signature scheme used in the withdrawal phase is a uniquely blind threshold 
signature scheme since its signing function is bijective [22,23] and the signed message m = HID 11 
RD 1) ACC, 11 7&(a) = <(IDc II X) II RD II ACC, II ‘?-&(a) is unique [19]. 
4.2. Security Considerations 
Lemma 3 guarantees the security of the preparation phase in Section 3. 
LEMMA 3. The preparation phase in Section 3 is a secure protocol for distributed key generation 
in discrete-log based cryptosystems. 
PROOF. The preparation phase of Section 3 is modified from the distributed key generation 
protocol proposed in [16]. In [16], G ennaro et al. have showed that their proposed distributed 
key generation protocol satisfies the simulation argument [16]. Compared with their scheme [16], 
in order to do cheat detection when some issuer cheats, the public shadows (Pj,i + g6jsi =p 
I-I:::(Vj,P’,, h w ere i and j E QUAL, will be published by all issuers in our proposed scheme. 
All the public shadows (Pj,i)y where i and j E QUAL, can be derived by the public .values 
vi,k =p gQ+, i E QUAL ,0 5 k 5 t - 1, broadcasted in Step 4 of the preparation phase. These 
public shadows will not disclose any extra information of the group secret key. The preparation 
phase of Section 3 ls secure; that is, the view of an adversary of the protocol is simulatable [16]. 1 
The blind signature generation in our proposed scheme is the scheme proposed in [22]. Lemma 4 
ensures the blindness of our proposed scheme. 
LEMMA 4. The threshold signature generation used in the withdrawal phase of Section 3 is 
blind 1221. I 
Preserving the privacy of customers from all the issuers and the bank is the basic property of 
our scheme. Also, the amount of an e-coin spent by a customer must be less or equal to 2 dollars 
withdrawn from the issuers and bank. Our proposed scheme preserves customers’ anonymity, 
but not untraceability if the same anonymous account is used for several transactions. Complete 
untraceability is preserved if each anonymous account is used only once [3], but this property 
may cause a customer to pay extra money for this added-value service. We now show that our 
proposed scheme possesses the above properties. 
In our protocol, a malicious bank may try to get the identification of the customer in the 
following possible ways. 
(1) Derive the identification of a customer who gets an anonymous account ACC, in the 
anonymous account requesting phase. 
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(2) Derive the link between the authentication message which is sent to the issuers in the 
withdrawal phase and the e-coin which is used in the anonymous deposit phase. 
(3) Derive ID, from the e-coin (7, s, m). 
To derive the identification of the customer in the anonymous account requesting phase is 
computationally infeasible since it clearly contradicts the assumption that there exists a secure 
anonymous channel. 
To derive the link between the authentication message which is sent to the issuers in the 
withdrawal phase and the e-coin which is used in the payment phase is computationally infeasible 
since it clearly contradicts the assumption that the blind threshold signature scheme is secure. 
To derive ID, from the e-coin (T, s, m) is computationally infeasible since it clearly contradicts 
the assumption that c is a secure one-way permutation function. 
From the above, the privacy of customers is protected in our proposed scheme. 
In our protocol, any withdrawn e-coins will be deposited into an anonymous account in the 
bank’s database. When some customer spends an e-coin, the bank will check if this e-coin is 
in an anonymous account in order to prevent double-spending. So all withdrawn e-coins can be 
used only once. Also, a malicious customer, let us call her Alice, may try to spend extra e-coins 
in the following possible ways. 
In our scheme, all issuers collaborate to generate threshold verifiable public keys. An eligible 
customer needs to withdraw an e-coin from t issuers and deposit this e-coin into his anonymous 
account before he can spend some money. If Alice can get an extra e-coin herself, then she can 
make a counterfeit blind threshold signature. It clearly contradicts the assumption that the blind 
threshold signature scheme is secure. 
Second, if Alice can forge a signature and pass the user authentication check done by Ij, 1 5 
j 5 t, in the withdrawal phase, then she can receive an extra e-coin. It clearly contradicts the 
assumption that the RSA signature scheme is secure. 
Third, given an used e-coin (T, s, m, 7, P&-,(a)), which represents 7 < x dollars and was spent 
by a customer, stored in the bank’s database, if Alice can derive another e-coin (T, s, m, e, ‘P&-(,+,) 
(a)), which represents e dollars, then she can spend extra money. The difficulty of this attack 
relies on the security of the one-way hash function 7-l 112,321. 
From the above, no customer can spend over the value of an e-coin by more than x dollars 
withdrawn from the bank in our proposed scheme. 
4.3. Implementation Considerations 
As mentioned in [l], in the near future everyone will be able to issue money via the internet. 
When exchanging the currencies of poorly-rated money issuers, an appropriate discount rate will 
be applied. In our scheme, the bank can choose honorable people as money issuers. Anyone 
can serve as the bank, and this person only manages all the accounts in the bank. He cannot 
issue any e-coins without the help of issuers. Also, anonymity will be a value-added feature. 
A customer will pay extra money if he uses this feature, or else this feature would be an extra 
service for an entrepreneur to keep customers and attract new customers. In our scheme, any 
anonymous accounts are closed if the lifetime of these accounts expires or the volume of these 
accounts becomes empty. The size of a bank’s database is dramatically reduced by this approach. 
The system parameters, including the expired date and the maximum amount of money which an 
anonymous account can store, etc., can be chosen and published by the bank. For simplifying the 
verification process in the payment phase, a customer can only send (ACC,, K,(RD 11 ACC, 11 
ID, 1) 7)) to the bank. The bank first decrypts Ac,(RD 11 ACC, 11 ID, 1) T) and checks whether 
the redundant information RD is in it. If yes, the bank verifies if 7 + E < x. If yes, the bank 
debits ACC, with e dollars, pays E dollars into ID,‘s account. This approach is more efficient, 
but some power is distributed to the bank; that is, the bank can operate all anonymous accounts. 
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This approach is like the current banking system in which all records manipulated by the bank 
must be recorded and there must be some designated auditors to trace these records at any time. 
In our proposed scheme, a customer must open an anonymous account, withdraw e-coins from 
some issuers, and deposit these e-coins into the anonymous account before he can spend money in 
some shop. These four phases can be simplified into just two phases: the withdrawal phase and 
the payment phase. In the modified withdrawal phase, the anonymous account ACC, is chosen 
by the customer, but not by the bank. In the modified payment phase, the bank must create an 
anonymous account ACC, when it receives a valid e-coin (T, s, m) = (r, s,‘Hro ]I RD ]I ACC, ]I 
‘&(a)). This approach is simpler, but to manage the bank’s database is also more complex 
and there exists a chance that the anonymous accounts chosen by customers may collide. In 
our proposed method, anonymous accounts are chosen by the bank; the bank can manage these 
accounts according its database conditions. 
In order to make the application interface user-friendly, t honest (available) issuers will be 
chosen by the client program automatically according to the internet conditions. From the point 
of view of the customers, all procedures of our proposed scheme would be transparent to them as 
would be those of single authority payment schemes [3,4,8,10,35,36]. In a distributed environment, 
for making the transaction of each blind threshold signature atomic, when a customer requests a 
blind threshold signature as an e-coin, the registration information must include the identification 
of t honest (available) issuers and a logical time-stamp for indicating this transaction and the 
registration information must be certificated by the customer. When any of t issuers received 
this certificate, he must first verify it. If it is valid, then he sends this certificate to the bank, 
and the bank can deduct x dollars from the customer’s account in the bank. If some transaction 
is unfinished, issuers must send the logs of this transaction to the bank. The bank can undo this 
transaction. All the above procedures can be inserted into programs and executed automatically. 
In real world environments, the candidates of issuers can be elected from honorable persons or 
audit managers. For practical implementation, we suggest the parameters t = 2 and n = 3. 
4.4. Performance Considerations 
In our scheme, the preparation phase only has to be performed once and can be done off-line. 
In the anonymous account requesting phase, a customer requests an anonymous account via an 
anonymous channel. All secure anonymous channels proposed in [28-301 can be applied to our 
scheme, but we recommend these systems in [28,30] since we only need an anonymous chan- 
nel which gives periodic delivery and not continuous delivery. In the withdrawal phase, every 
customer will request a blind threshold signature as an e-coin. The size of a blind threshold 
signature is the same as the size of an individual signature and the verification process of a 
blind threshold signature is the same as that of an individual signature [22,23]. The extra com- 
putation required for achieving the divisibility property of an e-coin is just hashing [12]. The 
value -zk/(xi - xk), 1 5 k 5 n and k # i, in Step 3 of the withdrawal phase can be com- 
puted off-line. So each issuer needs to compute only one modular exponentiation in our scheme, 
which is the same as in the underlying blind signature scheme. Compared with the underly- 
ing blind signature scheme, the extra cost for signing a blind threshold signature is to compute 
C,“=,+i fj(~i)(ntk=~,~~~(-xk/(5i - xk))) in Step 3 of the withdrawal phase, which contains n-2 
modular multiplications and n - t additions. To reduce the computational cost for the requester, 
the partial signature verification in Step 4 is not done except when the final e-coin cannot satisfy 
the verification equation in Step 2 of the anonymous deposit phase. In this method, the requester 
only needs to compute two modular exponentiations and one modular inverse in Step 2 of the 
withdrawal phase, which is the same as in the underlying blind signature scheme. Compared with 
the underlying blind signature scheme, the extra cost of requesting a blind threshold signature 
in our blind threshold signature scheme is to compute the values ta, n:=, ?k and ~~=i & in 
the equation s -Q CL=, Sk + CL=r(ikfl+ o) -Q ta + p ~~=, Sk which contains t + 1 modular 
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multiplications and t - 1 modular additions. In the payment phase, the cost of verifying an ecoin 
is just hashing [12]. 
5. CONCLUSION 
We have proposed an efficient anonymous payment scheme with anonymous accounts. By 
means of our scheme, the bank’s database is dramatically reduced. Also, a customer can request 
an e-coin from several issuers, who represent a bank, on the current available issuers list according 
to the internet conditions. 
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